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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN
HENDEE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Executor of the Last Will and Testament
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased;
GRANT. MACFARLANE; DANIEL
KOSTOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.

8216

PETITION FOR REHEARING
and
BRIEF I:t-;r SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COME NOW Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos, defendants and appellants herein, and respectfully
petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the
above-entitled case and for an order rnodifying this
Uourt's decision by granting to your petitioners a new
trial in accordance with the law as declared in said deciBlOll.
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We appreciate the fact that many petitions for rehearing are mere formalities which do not raise new and
unlitig.ated issues. \Ve submit, however, that such is
not the case here. This Court has rendered a decision
\Yhich, by its very nature creates problems and issues
heretofore never briefed or argued by either party. Each
of these issues separately, and all of them collectively,
are focal points upon which the ultimate decision in this
case could well turn.
This Petition is based on the following grounds:
Point I.
This court, by its opinion herein, has declared that
the presumption of fraud and undue influence arising
out of confidential relationship, procurement of a will
and heirship shifts the burden to the confidential advisor
of persuading the fact finder by a "preponderance" of the
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted.
The trial court erroneously imposed upon the proponents
of this vvill the burden of establishing lack of fraud and
undue influence by "clear and convincing" evidence. Inasmuch as a greater burden of proof was imposed upon
proponents than this Court has declared to be proper,
the proponents should be granted a new trial.
Point II.
This court has held as ;a 1natter of law that Gail
Swan had testimentary capacity to make a will. The
E·rroneous findings and conclusions of the trial court that
Gail lacked testamentary capacity to make a will vitally
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affected the weight of evidence on the issue of fraud and
undue influence and thereby prejudiced the proponents.
Point III.
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, erroneously declared that it was Macfarlane's "clear, unrevocable duty" to see to it that Wilda G.ail Swan had independent advice in connection with the preparation and
signing of the will and codicils. This court states in its
d.ecision herein, "As in the Jardine case, we recognize
such a showing as an important factor in determining
this question and reject the doctrine that without it such
presumption is irrebutable." This court should grant a
ne-vv trial so that the trier of the fact may consider lack
of independent advice not as an "unrevokable" obstacle
of proof on the part of the confidential advisor, but only
as an important factor.
Point IV.
This court has rejected the "prima facie evidence
1ule" advocated by proponents and has approved the
'·preponderance of the evidence rule." With the burden
of proving a lack of fraud and undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence re·sting with proponents, the
erroneous admission into evidence over objection of defendant of the file in the Becker matter indicating that
once before Macfarlane had been accused of fraud and
undue influence was highly prejudicial. The fact the trial
court stated that he thought such evidence was proper
and was admissible indicates that the trial court con-
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sidered improper matters in arriving at its decision.
Accompanying this Petition and filed here·with is .a
Brief in Support Thereof.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
Wayne L. Black
Counsel for Defendant and
· Appellant} Grant Macfarlane

N. J. Cotro-Manes
Counsel for Defendant and
Appel.lantJ Daniel K ostopulos

I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for
the defendant, Gr.ant Macfarlane, who is a petitioner
herein, and that in my opinion, there is good cause to
believe the judgment objected to is erroneous and that
the case should be re-examined as prayed for in said
petition.
DATED this ________________________ day of l\Iarch, 1956.

Wayne L. Black
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

POINT I.
. THIS COUR.T, BY ITS OPINION HEREIN, HAS DECLARED THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD AND UN1
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DUE INFLUENCE ARISING OUT OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP, PROCUREMENT OF A WILL AND HEIRSHIP
SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE CONFIDENTIAL ADVISOR
OF PERSUADING THE FACT FINDER BY A "PREPONDERANCE'' OF THE EVIDENCE THAT NO FRAUD OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED. THE TRIAL COURT
ERRONEOUSLY IMPOSED UPON THE PROPONENTS OF
THIS WILL THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING LACK OF
FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE BY "CLEAR AND CONVINCING" EVIDENCE. INASMUCH AS A GREATER BURDEN OF PROOF WAS IMPOSED UPON PROPONENTS
THAN 'THIS COURT HAS DE,CLARED TO BE PROPER,
'I'I-IE PROPONEN·TS SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL.

Mr. Justice Wade, in his 1fajority Opinion, reviews
the Utah c.ases concerning the legal effects of various
})resumptions. He states:
"Some opinions in this court have held that
the only effect of a presumption is to place on
the disfavored party the burden of producing
prima facie evidence to the contrary and thereupon the presumption is eliminated, and it is
firmly established that such is the effect of many
preslunptions. Hovvever, we have also recognized
that other presumptions are not so eliminated but
have the effect of placing on the disfavored party
the burden of persuading the fact finder that the
facts are contrary to the presumed facts; some
by a preponderance of the evidence, others by
clear and convincing evidence, and still others bY
proof beyond reasonable doubt. * * * "
.
Thus, it can be seen th.at four lines of decisions have
existed in the State of Utah. For the sake of brevity,
,~·e 'vill refer to said lines of decisions as the "prin~a facie
evidence rule," the "preponderance of the evidence rule,''
the "clear and convincing evidence· rule," and the "beyonfl
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reasonable doubt rule." The "beyond a reasonable
doubt rule" has .application primarily to criminal cases
nnd is of no concern to us here.

H

At the trial of· this case the position of proponents
\Vas that the "prima facie evidence rule" was applicable.
Proponents cited in support of their position In re
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609, where~
Catholic priest had procured a 'vill in which his church
\Vas m.ade a principal beneficiary and where the court
~tated:

"This court is committed to the doctrine that,
when facts and circumstances are shown concerning whioh a presumption arises or is indulged, the
presumption ceases, and the case is to be decided
on the evidence introduced independently of the
presumption; that is, that the presumption is not
evidence and has no weight as evidence. In re
Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230, and
{3tate v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177."
In the Bryan case, the burden of proving fraud and
undue influence shifted back to the party claiming such
fraud and undue influence upon the introduction of prima
facie evidence of a lack of fraud and undue influence.
We believed that the Bryan case correctly stated the law
as it existed in Utah at the tune of trial. We also cited
1o the trial court In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463,
5 P. 2d 2·30; Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac.
553; In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P. 2d 372; Peterson v.
Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12; Buhler v. Maddison,
109 Utah 267, 176 P. 2d 118; M echarn v. Allen, 1 Utah
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2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285; Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain
Express Co., 242 P. 2d 764, 769; Gibbs v. Blue Cab,,
________ Utah ________ , 249 P. 2d 213; State v. Green, 78 Utah
580, 6 P. 2d 177; Clark v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 73
Utah 486, 275 Pac. 582; Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
46 Utah 530, 151 Pac. 71; King v. Denver & Rio Grande
TV estern Railroad Co., 116 Utah 488; 211 P. 2d 833.
Justice Hoyt in his dissenting opinion appears to be
of the opinion that we were correct in our position. He
states:

" * * * I am strongly in favor of retention of
the rule heretofore repeatedly announced by this
court ,and adopted by the American Law Institute
that when rebutting evidence is introduced, the
issue should be decided upon the evidence - without having the jury or trier of the facts confus.ed
by incoinprehensible explanations as to the effect of a presumption or as to the quantum of
proof required to overcome a given presumption.
***"
Counsel for the contestant on the other hand contPnded vigorously that the "clear and convincing evidence
rule" was the proper principle of law to be applied in
the case. In their written 1nemor.andun1 to the trial court
follovving the oral .arguments, counsel repeatedly referred
to the "clear and convincing evidence rule" citing cases
in support thereof. At page 8 of said Memorandum appears the following statement:

" * * * The 'basic facts' so proven are of
such substance and of such probative value that
their establishment results in the conviction that
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undue influence was exercised, and such conviction can be dissipated and ove~rcome only by clear
and convincing evidence that there was no undue
influence."
Counsel then cited the case of In re Pilcher's Estate,
114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143. On the same page, counsel
stated:
"There are two decisions of the Supreme
Court of Utah which leave it clear beyond .any
doubt that the burden lay upon the defendants
to clearly prove the absence of undue influence.
They are Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102
Pac. 211, and Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley,
72 Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797."
And ag.ain at page 17 of said Memorandum, counsel
stated:
"The basic facts showing the relationships
between l\{acf.arlane and Kostopulos on the one
side and Gail on the other persist from the beginning of the trial until the end, and because they
do presist the legal result of such facts requires
a finding of undue influence unless there is clear
and convincing proof to the contrary. * * * "
The urgency with which counsel foi" contestant have
g}ways contended for the "cle:ar and convincing evidence
rule" can be fully appreciated by an examination of the
Brief of Respondent on Appeal." At page 27 of counsel's brief ,the following statement appears:

" * * * When such proof was made the burden was then cast upon defendants to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the .absence of fraud
and undue influence. It was up to the trial court
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as the trier of the facts to determine whether
defendant had furnished the necessary proof.

***"
At p.age 30, counsel quotes the following from the
Pilcher case, supra:

" * * * Such presumption presists until it is
overcome by clear, convincing and conclusive evidence."
Commenting on said statement as follows:
"The decision in the Pilcher case is a conclusive answer to the suggestion of the defendants
that the presumption of undue influence has
vanished from the instant case. * * * "
Counsel then discussed at length the Jardine case,
the Peterson case and Omega case and su1nmarizes as
follows:
"The basic facts showing the relationships
between ~1acfarlane and Kostopulos on the one
side and Gail on the other persists from the beginning of the trial until the end, and because
they do persist the legal result of such facts requires a finding of undue influence unless there
is clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
Such is the holding of the many cases which are
cited below."
And then at page 56, counsel states:
"All of appellant's conclusions reflect upon
appellant's refusal to appreciate or recognize the
r1tle of law that imposed upon them th~e burden of
freeing then~selves froJn the charge of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence."
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At the time of trial the only Utah cases supporting
the "preponderance of evidence rule" were Walton v.
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97; Baldwin v. Nielson,
110 Utah 172,170 P. 2d 179; Bradley v. Miller, 109 Utah
f>38, 167 P. 2d 978 .and State v. Steadman, 70 Utah 224,
259 Pac. 326. None of these cases \vere ever cited or
n1entioned by contestant either at the time of trial or
on .appeal. The Walton case involved the presumption
that the best interests of a child are served by its being
in the custody of its natural parents. The court held
that such presumption could be overcome by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. The Baldwin case and
the Bradley case involved the same presumption \vith
the same holding. The Steadman c.ase involved the presumption of innocence of a defendant in a bastardy proceeding. The court pointed out that a bastardy proceeding is not criminal in nature and that the presumption
of innocence, although it existed, could nevertheless be
overcome by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary.
The situation thus confronting the trial court was
as follows: The proponents of the will eontended vigorously for the "prima facie evidence rule." The contestant
of the \vill contended with equal vigor for the "clear and
convincing evidence rule." No one had the remotest idea
that the law of Utah required the proponents to establish
a lack of fraud and undue influence by a '·preponderance
of the evidence." Certainly the trial court never expres~ed his belief that such was the law in Utah. He followed
counsel for contestant's view of the law at every stage
in the proceedings and adopted the Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel without so
n1uch as the change of a comma.
If the trial court had followed the "prima facie
evidence rule" the decision would have been in favor
of proponents. This court in its majority opinion, has
conceded such to be the fact where it states :
"Under such rule the trial court's finding of
fraud and undue influence probably is not supported by the evidenee 7 but if the burden of persuasion is shifted the finding is supported by
proof of the basic faets of the presumption."
Justice lioyt put the 1natter somewhat stronger in
his dissenting opinion where he states:
"As to the evidence in this case, I believe that
.a careful study of the transeri pt and the findings
of fact and memorandum decision of the trial
court will show that there is no evidence or no
finding by the court of any act of deceit, deception, concealment, misrepresentation, solicitation
or coercion on the part of Macfarlane or any attempt on his part to encourage or create discord
between G.ail Swan and her sister, Theo, or to
persuade Gail to omit Theo from her will."
If the trial court didn't follow the "prin~a facie evidence rule" that leaves only the "preponderance of the
evidence rule" and the "clear and convincing evidence
rule" that the trial court could have followed. In view
of the fact that nobody ever mentioned the "preponderance of evidence rule" or cited any cases in support of
that rule, and in view of the fact th.at counsel for contestant contended so earnestly for the "clear and convincing
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evidence rule" plus the fact that the trial court agreed
'vith counsel for contestant and adopted without change
their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, it
is cle.ar beyond dispute that the trial court did in fact
adopt the "clear and convincing evidence rule."
This conclusion becomes even more apparent when
we consider the uncertainty of our own supreme court
on the subject of presumptions. The Bryan case quite
clearly adopted the "printa facie evidence rule" in a will
rontest case. Yet eight months after the trial court's
opinion in the case at har this court in Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, 'vhere a gift was made
by a decedent to a fiduciary without consideration, stated:
"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the donor
and donee, equity raises a presumption against
the validity of such transactions and the burden
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity
and that there was no fraud or undue influence by
proving affirmatively and by clear and convincing
evidence in compliance with equitable requisites."
Now this court follows the "preponderance of the evidence rule" and states:
"This is contrary to our holding in the Jardine case, which is supported by the California
cases and some other decisions that cle.ar and convincing evidence to the contrary is necessary to
overco1ne such presumption. We reach this conclusion because we feel that the rule is more clear
and understandable than the rule requiring clear
and convincing evidence; that this rule is more
apt to produce .a just result and is more generally
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recognized as the correct rule governing this
situation."
The hardships arising from confusion as to the lavv
of Utah should not fall on the shoulders of either litit;ant. Both are entitled to a trial according to what this
court believes to be most conducive to producing a just
result.
The suprerne court of this state has developed a considerable body of law outlining the distinction between
preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing
evidence, and in a recent case has reversed a trial court
for instructing a jury that the burden of proving mutual
rnistake of fact was by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than by clear and convincing evidence.
See K ir-chgester v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Rail'road Company (Dec. 14, 1950), ______ Utah ______ , 225 P.
2d 754, where the court granted appellant's petition for
rehearing in the follovving language:
"The .appellant's petition for rehearing is
granted to allow us to consider on its merits the
question of whether the lower court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that in order to avoid
the release executed by the plaintiff, he must
prove a mutual mistake of fact by clear and unequivocal evidence."
The court reversed said case at 233 P. 2d 699, 700
and stated:
"The appellant's petition for rehearing was
granted in this case to allow us to consider on its
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merits the question wheth·er the trial court erred
in denying the appellant's request that the jury
be instructed that in order to avoid the release
executed by the respondent, he must prove a mutual mistake of fact by 'clear .and unequivocal'
evidence. Instead, the court charged the jury that
a mutual mistake of fact need only he proved by
a 'preponderance of the evidence.' For the facts
of the case, see our original opinion, Utah, 218 P.
2d 685.
"Upon the authorities cited in our opinion
granting the petition for rehe.aring, Utah, 225
P. 2d 754, we conclude that the lower court erred
in the particular above mentioned and that such
error necessitates a reversal of the case for a new
trial. It would serve no us.eful purpose to further
discuss those authorities here."
The court then discussed the meaning of the words,
cle.ar and convincing and stated:
"We had occasion recently to examine the
expression 'clear and convincing' evidence. See
Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P. 2d 194, 205.
There we remarked that 'for a matter to be clear
and convincing to a particular mind it must at
least have reached the point where there remains
no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which was of the
opinion that it w.as convinced and yet which entertained, not a light, but a reasonable doubt as to the
correctness of its conclusions, would seem to be in
a state of confusion.'
"Further, we said: 'That proof is convincing
which carries with it, not only the power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
element of clinching such truth or correctness.
Clear .and convincing proof clinches what might
be otherwise only probable to the mind.' See
Southvvestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of San
Antonio, Texas, D.C., 4F. Supp. 570, 573 where it
was stated that proof is not 'clear and convincing'
if the court entertains a reasonable doubt."

In Northcrest Incorporated v. Walker Bank and
Trust Company) et al.) (Sept. 29, 1952), 248 P. 2d 692,
this court .again defined the terms clear and convincing
in the following language :
"For evidence to be clear and convincing it
must be such that there is no serious or substantial
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion."
On the other hand, the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires only that the proof
be "more probable," or that it be of "greater weight" than
evidence to the contrary. See Stoker v. Ogden City) (Feb.
25, 1936), 54 P. (2) 849; Alvarado v. Tucker) (April 2/
1954), 2 Ut.ah 2d 16,268 P. (2) 986; John Ainsfield Co. v.
Rasmussen) 30 Utah 453, 85 P. 1002·; Hickey v. Rio
(}rande Western Ry. Co.) 29 Utah 392, 82 P. 29; and
TVilkinson v . .Anderson Taylor Co.) 28 Utah 346, 79 P.
46.
The total sum of evidence presented by the contestant
on the issue of fraud and undue influence was that the
proponents occupied a confidential relationship with the
testator, had an opportunity to exert fraud and undue
influence, that Macfarlane prepared the will in which he
'vas made a substantial beneficiary, and that Macfarlane

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
did not obtain independent advice for Gail.
On the other side of the ledger was the uncontradicted evidence that Gail had an abiding affection for
Macfarlane, Kostopulos and the Bridges, 'vas deeply
appreciative of their many acts of kindness and genuinely
desired to make them beneficiaries in her will; that Gail
appeared normal and competent to the witnesses to the
will and codicils on the three occasions of execution;
that the second codicil was actually witnessed by a medical doctor and a psychiatrist, who testified that in their
opinion she was competent and business-like .at the time
said codicil was executed; that the will and codicils were
in existence five years during which Gail mingled freely
with friends and relatives, alike; and that at the time
Macfarlane was last claimed to have been exercising
fraud and undue influence on Gail he was actually writing a codicil to her will reducing his interest in the amount
of $24,500.00.
It is difficult for us to believe that the foregoing
evidence did not preponderate against a finding of fraud
and undue influence. Counsel for contestant connnenting on the length of time the will and codicils were in
existence stated at page 57 of the Brief of Respondent:
"Such fact, standing alone, may be evidence
to be conside,red by the court, but it cannot be said
to be clear and convincing proof."
The many other important facts heretofore mentioned likewise would be entitled to consideration in determining wherein lay the preponderance of evidence, but
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rnay not have been considered clear and convincing proof.
From the record it is reasonable to assume that the trial
court believed the preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence was against a finding of fraud and undue influence but that such evidence was not clear and convincing.
Proponents \vere not accorded a chance to prev:ail on
this issue if the evidence preponderated in their favor.
This court has held that where a trial court sitting
\vithout a jury renders its decision under a misimpression of the law and prejudice results, such decision will
not be allowed to stand.
In Walker v. Peterson, (Dec. 16, 1954) 3 Utah 2d 54,
278 P~ 2d 291, the trial court, sitting without a jury, made
the following comrnent as to the law applicable:

"* * * He who makes the left turn on * * *
through highways must take the responsibility regardless of speed or any other circumstances,***"
The court then found that both parties to the collision
were negligent. This court in reversing the trial court
n1ade the following statement:
"It is true generally that statements made by
the trial judge do not necessarily affect the validity of a judgment if it is otherwise sustainable.
But this is not true if the statements make manifest that a material issue was analyzed by the
court under an erroneous conception as to the law
applicable thereto (as seems to have been done
here) and under such circumstances that a correct
application of the law might well have produced a
different result. For the fact trier to be under
such a 1nisapprehension of the law would be com-
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par.able to having the jury find a verdict under
erroneous instructions as to the law."
In the case of State v. Whitely, (Utah S. Ct., Feb.
14, 1951), 110 P. 2d 337, the trial court sat 'vithout a jury
where the defendant was charged with burglary in the
second degree. The defense was that of alibi. In finding
the defendant guilty, the trial court stated that it was
bis belief defendant had the burden of proving an alibi.
This court reversed the trial court holding that the burden of proving guilt never shifts from the government
in a criminal case. The court stated :
"In the instant case, the statements made by
the court were matters of law upon which if given
to the jury this court would base its revers.al and
order a new trial, as such instruction would have
been erroneous.
"The case is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with the vie,vs
expressed in this opnion."
If this case had been tried before a jury and the
jury had been instructed that it w:as incun1bent upon the
proponents to establish a lack of fraud and undue influence by clear and convincing rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, such an instruction under
the Kirchgestner case, supra, would have been reversible
error. The trial court as trier of the f.act rendered its
decision under the same erroneous impression as to the
law of the State of Utah.
A "rill contest case is an action at la,v. See In re
Hansen's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103; In re Swan's
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Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, .and this court's majority opinion herein. Therefore, this court cannot reweigh
the evidence. Proponents should have an opportunity
to establish their innocence of fraud and undue influence
by a preponderance of the evidence if that is the law of
·utah. Such an opportunity has never been accorded
them. The trial court required cle.ar and convincing eviclence. This court has rejected that requirement and
declared proponents right to trial under the preponderance of evidence rule. But a mere declaration of right
unless translated into action is as "sounding brass or a
tinkling symbol." The only way the trial court's error
c.an be corrected is by granting proponents a new trial.

POINT II.
THIS COURT HAS HELD AS A MATTER OF LA\"'>
THAT GAIL SWAN HAD 'TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO
l\IAKE A WILL. THE ERRONEOUS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT GAIL LACKED
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL VITALLY
AFFECTED THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE
OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THEREBY
PREJUDICED THE PROPONENTS.

At page 6 of its memorandun1 decision, the trial court
states:
"As heretofore stated, I conclude that this
contest must be sustained upon both grounds alleged in the complaint:
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to
make the Will or Codicils.
2. That in any event, the Will and Codicils
were the product of .and resulted from fraud and
undue influence of both Macfarlane and Kostopulos."
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In its Findings of Fact, Numbers 25, 26, 27 and 30,
the trial court finds that when the will and codicils were
executed, Gail lacked testamentary capacity. In its Conclusions of Law, Numbers 1, 3, 5 and 7, the court concludes as a matter of law that Gail lacked testamentary
capacity to execute a will on the three occasions when
the will and codicils were executed.
The quality of mind of the alleged victim is an important factor in determining the issue of fraud and undue influence. Obviously a strong minded individual is
less apt to succumb to fraud and undue influence than
one with a weak mind. A person having testamentary
capacity is a less likely object of fraud and undue influence than a person lacking testamentary cap.acity.
The trial court held and apparently believed that
Gail was so lacking in mentality that she did not have
sufficient mind and memory to remember who were the
rtatural objects of her bounty, recall to mind her property,
and dispose of its understandingly according to some
plan forrned in her mind. This erroneous impression of
the facts on the part of the trial court unquestionably
placed an improper burden on proponents in negating the
presumption of fraud and undue influence. This court
1n holding that the evidence did not sustain a finding of
lack of testamentary c.a pacity stated:
''This evidence when considered separately or
all together does not indicate a lack of testamentary capacity but at most merely indicates a slightly below nor1nal adult mental .age. It does not
indicate that she did not remember the natural
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objects of her bounty or did not keep in mind her
property or lack of ability to dispose of it understandingly in accordance with some purpose or
plan. This is especially true in view of the volume
of evidence to the contrary. The contestant had
the burden of proving or persuading the trier of
the fact by the evidence that she lacked testamentary capacity. We conclude that in view of all of
the evidence the finding of the trial court that she
lacked testamentary capacity was unreasonable
and must be reversed."
In an atten1pt to cleanse the record of the trial court's
error, this court adopts the following procedure:
"The case is remanded with directions that the
findings and decree be corrected in accordance
with the views herein expressed, but that the decision of the trial court be affirmed to the effect
that the bequests to !1:acfarlane and Kostopulos
are null and void for fr.aud and undue influence."
But the serious question is, does the remanding of the
case to the trial court vvith directions to correct its erroneous decision cleanse the record of prejudice to the
proponents? This court in its majority opinion concedes
that such prejudice in fact occurred when it states:
"The fact that Gail had testamentary capacity makes it more probable that she was not induced to make these bequests by fraud or undue
influence."
The trial court's misimpression on this issue so colorEd the finding on the issue of fraud and undue influence
that the only vvay in which the record can be corrected
and true justice done the parties is for this court to
grant a new trial. One of the trial judges of this juris-
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diction has a saying that would seem to be p.articularly
appropriate here. "You can take the fly out of the soup,
but you can't take the taste of the fly out of the soup."

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION,
ERRONEOUSLY DECLARED THAT IT WAS MACFARLANE'S "CLEAR, UNREVOCABLE DU'TY" TO SEE TO IT
THAT WILDA GAIL SWAN HAD INDEPENDEN'T ADVICE
IN CONNEtCTION WITH THE PREPARATION AND SIGNING OF THE WILL ANI) CODICILS. THIS COURT STATES
IN ITS DECISION HEREIN, "AS IN 'THE JARDINE CASE,
'VE RE,COGNIZE SUCH A SHOWING AS AN IMPORTANT
F AICTOR IN DETERlVIINING THIS QUES'TI!ON AND REJECT THE DOCTRINE !THAT WI'THOUT IT SUCH A PRESUMPTION IS IRREBUTTABLE." THIS COURT SHOULD
GRANT A NEW TRIAL SO THAT THE TRIER OF THE FACT
MAY CONSIDER LACK OF INDEPENDENT ADVICE NOT
AS AN "UNREVOKABLE" OB8TAtCLE OF PROOF ON THE
PART OF THE CONFIDENTIAL ADVISOR, BUT ONLY AS
AN "IMPORTANT FACTOR."

During the trial, eounsel for contestant contended that failure of ~Iacfarlane to see to it that
G-ail had independent advice before she executed the will
and codicils 'vas decisive of the ease. This is indicated
by the following statement appearing at page 16 of thejr
trjal 1nemor.andum with reference to the Omega lnvest1.nent ease, supra:
"Please note that the Supreme Court of Utah
gave its fine approval in the foregoing to the decision of the Oklahoma court that, it is his duty,
before accepting the conveyance, to see to it that
the grantor had disinterested advice and full
information."
('o.

Although the language of the Onzegn In vestrnent
case, supra, does not contain the meaning contended
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for iti·;,by ;counsel at the time of trial, there is no doubt~
that the t~ial court adopted such meaning, and .applied it
to the case at bar. At page 2 of his Memorandum Decision, the Court states:

"* * * In the circumstances surrounding the
signing of this purported Will, Macfarlane certainly was in a position of such dominating influence that it was his clear ttnrevocable duty to see
to it that vVilda Gail Swan had independent advice in connection with the preparation and signing of such .an important document."
In \V ebster's New International Dictionary, Second
}~dition, Unabridged, the word revoke is variously defined
as to revise, to repeal, to rescind, to cancel, to withdraw.
The prefix "un" when used with verbs is declared to express the contrary or reversal and not the simple negative of the action of the verb to which it is prefixed.
Thus, it can be seen that the trial court believed
that ~iacf.arlane had a duty to secure independent advice
that could not be revoked, revised, repealed, rescinded,
cancelled or withdrawn.
This court, eight months after the memorandum decision of the trial court elaborated upon the law with
respect to the need for independent advice where fiduciary relationships were involved in the case of Jardine
v. Arch.ibald, supra, where it stated:
"Appellants also cite Omega Investment Co.
v. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797 as placing
Utah with the jurisdictions holding that independent advice is necessary to sustain a transac-
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tion where a fiduciary relationship exists. We do
not understand that case to have so held."
Counsel for contestant in the Brief of Respondent
have conceded that their original position with regard to
the need for independent advice was erroneous in view of
the interpretation of the Omega Investment Co. case,
supra, by this court in the Jardine case, supra, where they
state at page 37 :
"It is noted, however, that in Jardine v. Archibald, supra, this court stated that by its decision in
Omega v. Woolley, it did not intend to make independent advice an inflexible necessity."
To summarize the situation, counsel for contestant
contended during the trial that the need for independent
. advice was an inflexible necessity. The trial court held
'vith contestant and stated in his Memorandum Decision
that Macfarlane had a clear unrevokable dttty to see to
it that Gail had independent advice before executing the
"Till. Under these circumstances the fact that the evidence preponderated against the claim of fraud and
11ndue influence became of secondary nnportance. It was
conceded that no independent advice was obtained for
Gail, and this settled the issue in the mind of the trial
court. If the trial court in effect held, as 've contend,
that without independent advice the presumption of fraud
and undue influence is irrebuttable, the case probably
turned on this proposition alone. Here again the trial
court has taken an erroneous vie'v of the law; one upon which its decision may well have turned, and one which
\Vould seern to demand a new trial with the fact of lack of
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independent advice cast in its proper perspective. We
quote from the majority opinion:
"As in the Jardine case, we recognize such a
showing as an important factor in determining
this question and reject the doctrine that without
it stttch presumption is irrebuttable."
POINT IV.
THIS COURT HAS REJECTED THE "PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE RULE" ADVOCA'TED BY PR.OPONENTS AND
HAS APPROVED THE "PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RULE." WITH THE BURDEN OF PROVING A
LACK OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RESTING WITH PROPONENTS, THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION INTO EVIDEN~CE OVER OBJECTION OF DEFENDENTS OF THE
FILE IN THE BECKER MATTER INDICATING THAT ONCE
BEFORE MACFARLANE HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF FRAUD
AND UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL.
THE FACT THE TRIAL COURT STATED THAT HE
THOUGHT SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PROPER AND WAS ADMISSIBLE INDICATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED IMPROPER MATTERS IN ARRIVING AT ITS
DECISION.

At and follovving the trial of this case, it was the
position of the proponents that upon admission of prima
facie evidence showing .a lack of fraud and undue influence the presu1nption would disappear. It was clear that
no actual evidence of fraud and undue influence existed
in the case and we firmly believed that the trial court
would find as a matter of law that contestant had failed
to sustain her burden of proof on that issue. Such was
our position on appeal to this court. This court has now
declared that the burden of proof remained with proponents to establish a lack of fraud and undue influence
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by .a preponderance of the evidence. With the "preponderance of the evidence rule" to guide a determination
of this issue, factors which might affect the credibility of
the witnesses now become of utmost importance. Counsel for contestant offered in evidence at the trial the file
in the Estate of George C. Becker, Case No. 31409 which
contained the record of a will contest and an allegation
that M.acfarlane had exerted fraud and undue influence
upon the decedent. The following events took place as
shown at Record 244:
"J\1R. ROBERTS: In order for the record,
we'd like to make an objection, your Honor, as to
the materiality of this matter on anything pertaining to this case.
THE COURT: Well, I think it has, ~Ir. Roberts, some materiality. Just how much materiality
it has this court isn't in a position to say, but I arn
going to receive it in evidence and you may have
your exception to the court's ruling."
And again at Record 245:
"THE COURT: Mr. Ray, will you state to the
court the materiality of the proposed exhibit, as
you view it~
lVIR. RAY: Yes. I'll he glad to, if the court
please.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. RAY: This witness is a 1nen1ber of the
bar. He is an officer of this court. He is here
charged with imposing upon his client. He has
testified that he made no effort to see that this
woman had any independent advice whatsoever.
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Now right while these matters were going on he
was charged in another case with being the beneficiary in the will of his client, a will which he
himself drew. That put him on notice, if he didn't
have it before, of what the duties and obligations
of a lawyer are to his client.
THE COURT: From that standpoint you
deem it material~
MR. RAY: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: We object to it, your Honor,
on the ground that it is immaterial.
TI-IE COURT: The court will overrule the
objection, and adhere to the former statement
made by the court. It will be received in evidence."
Counsel for contestant claimed in support of the
Becker evidence that the fact Macfarlane w.as accused
of fraud and undue influence in that case put him on
notice "of \vhat the duties and obligations of a lawyer
are to his client." That was the sole purpose for which
the evidence was offered. l\o effort was made by counsel to relate just what were the "duties and obligations~'
to which he had reference. Counsel did make some reference to the fact that Macfarlane did not obtain independent advice for Gail. But the Becker matter could neither
add to nor distract from this undisputed fact.
The issue was whether Macfarlane practiced fraud
and undue influence on Gail, not the quality of his knowledge as to the duties and obligations "of a lawyer to his
client." If he had a keener knowledge of his duties this
"'Nould make it less not more likely that he practiced fraud
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and undue influence on a client and if he practiced fraud
and undue influence whether he did this act ,vith a keen
or a dull sense of duty would not add or detract fro1n the
illegality of the will. This is not a punitive action. This
is an action to determine legality of a will.
M.acfarlane was absolutely innocent of any wrongdoing in the Becker matter. The contest "ras dismissed
and the will admitted to probate. But no amount of
protestation of innocence or claim of immateriality could
remove the harmful effect of this evidence. The stubborn
truth is that the sole and only purpose for introducing
the Becker matter in evidence was to inflame the mind
of the trial court and to accomplish by prejudice what
could not be accomplished by legitimate evidence. The
~uccess of this dubious enterprise can be seen in the results achieved.
Furthermore, it cannot no'v be successfully contended
that the trial court was not influenced by such evidence,
'vhere he declared in allowing its admission that he
thought it material and proper.
The general rule as to .ad1nissibility of this type evjclence is set forth in 32 C.J.S. 433 Sec. 579 as follows:
"Evidence of similar acts or transactions is
inadmissible when irrelevant to the issues in the
case. Thus the law will not consider evidence that
a person has, or has not, done .a certain act at a
particular time as probative of a contention that
he has, or has not, done a similar act at another
ti1ne."
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And in 1 Jones on Evidence, 247 Sec. 140 it is said:
"The question of relevancy frequently arises
when the offered proof relates to transactions, acts
and declarations of strangers or of one of the parties to the action in his dealings with strangers.
Evidence of the latter sort in general, it would
be manifestly unjust to admit, since the conduct
of one man under certain circumstances or toward
certain individuals, varying .as it will necessarily
do according to the motives which influence· him,
the qualities he possesses and his knowledge of
the character of those with whom he is dealing, can
never afford a safe criterion by which to judge
of the behavior of another man similarly situated,
or of the same man toward other persons."
See also the following cases cited by Jones in support
of the foregoing proposition:

Ilartrnan v. Evans, 38 \V. Va. 669, 18 S.E. 810, where
evidence that the plaintiff habitually made usurious
loans to persons other than the defendant is irrelevant
to the issue as to usury in a loan to defendant.
Davis v. }Ifeyer, 115 ~J eb. 251, 212 N.W. 435, 50
A.I.J.R. 1410, where it was held that circulation by others
{Jf rumors similar to the defamatory statements by the
defendant is irrelevant in an action of slander.
I-Iere no effort was made to show that the f.acts in
the Becker matter were at all like the facts regarding
l\1acfarlane's treatment of Gail. The reason given for
offering said evidence on its face demonstrated that the
evidence did not relate to any legitimate issue in the case.
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And the evidence had the vice of giving rise to dark forebodings and suspicions which were unfounded in fact and
extremely prejudicial in nature.

CONCLUSION
( 1) This court has declared that the best rule and
the rule it is following in this case is that proponents had
the burden of proving lack of fraud and undue influence
by a preponderance of the evidence. At the time of trial
nobody had the .remotest idea that the preponderance of
evidence rule was the law of Utah. No cases were cited
or argument made in behalf of said rule. Counsel for
proponents earnestly urged that the "prima facie evidence
rule" applied. Counsel for contestant just as earnestly
urged that the "clear and convincing evidence rule" applied. Contestant prevailed and the trial court signed
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by
counsel for contestant without a single change. The conclusion is inesc.a pable that the trial court followed the
"clear and convincing evidence rule." We believe that in
com1non justice proponents should be entitled to not just
the hardships of the "preponderance of evidence rule"
but to the benefits as 'veil. Proponents should have an
opportunity to prove lack of fraud and undue influence
by a preponderance of the evidence if that is the la'v
of lTtah. They have certainly never yet had this opportunity.

In the K irchgestner case, supra, this court has de-
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clared that the difference in burden of proof between clear
and convincing evidence and preponderance of the evidence is so vital that to impose one burden when the other
is proper is prejudicial and reversible error. In the
]{ irchgestner case, this court granted .a rehearing to air
the very point we are now raising and reversed its own
previous stand. We sincerely feel that we should be given
the same opportunity here.
( 2) This court has very justifiably held as a matter
of la-\v that Gail had testamentary c.apacity to make a wilL
The trial court incorrectly held both as a legal proposition and as a proposition of fact that Gail did not have
testamentary c.apacity.
We ask the simple question, would proponents'
chances of prevailing on the issue of fr.aud and undue
influence have been enhanced if the trial court had correctly found as fact and determined as law that Gail
had testamentary

capacity~

This Court, in its majority

opinion, has conceded that such would be the case, and has
thus conceded the prejudice to proponents from this obvious error by the trial court.
When the trial court's erroneous decision that Gail
lacked testamentary capacity is added to the trial court's
erroneous application of the "clear and convincing evidence rule" with regard to burden of proof the prejudice
to proponents is compounded many fold.
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(3) The trial court has in1posed upon Macfarlane
the "clear, unrevocable duty" to have seen to it that Gail
Swan had independent advice in connection with the
preparation and signing of the will and codicils.
This court in the Jardine case, supra, and in its majority opinion here has recognized lack of independent
advice as an important factor but has rejected the doctrine that without it the presumption of fraud and undue
influence is irrebuttable. The trial court's erroneous
impression of the law on this subject was decidedly prejudicial to proponents.
( 4) The trial court wrongfully admitted in evidence
and considered the inflammatory Becker matter. This
evidence was duly accepted to by counsel for proponents.
At the time we wrote the Brief of Appellants we believed that the issue of fraud and undue influence would
be resolved as in the Bryan case, supra, and that considerations of weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses would be immaterial. But in view of the present
decision of this court, where the credibility of Macfarlane
n1ay very well have been decisive of the case, this highly
inflammatory and improper evidence becomes of vital
i1nportance.
This evidence may very well have cast into the
court's n1ind such a feeling of bias and prejudice as to
have rendered him incapable of believing J\tfacfarlane
even though there was no other evidence which in any
Inanner effected his credibility or good character.
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\Ve respectfully sub1nit that a rehearing should be
granted in order that this 1-Ionorable Court may have an
opportunity to fully hear and consider the new issues
raised by its majority decision herein.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
WAYNE L. BLACK
Counsel for Defendant and
Appellant, Grant Macfarlane
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
N. J. COTRO-MANES
Counsel for Defendant and
Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
RECEIVED ---------------- copies of the within Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in Support thereof this _______________ _
day of April, 1956.

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent
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